We document that recent quasi-experimental strategies for identifying advertising eects can be derived from a model in which ad decisions are made at a more aggregate level than conversion is measured. Next, we show that the identifying variation in one of these strategies, the Border Approach, is conceptually similar to what are commonly known as Waldfogel IVs. We compare these, as well as supply-side instruments and xed eects, in a data set on advertising in US presidential elections. Both border approaches and IVs are known to sacrice statistical power and they do, but not by enough to aect statistical signicance, in this application. The Waldfogel IVs are much more powerful than the supply-side IVs and, when combined, the standard errors are substantially reduced. Each IV estimator has the potential to produce a local average treatment eect that weights aggregate markets dierently. Estimates suggest dierences may exist, but they are not signicant. When both IVs are combined, the point estimate is identical to a xed eect estimate that is likely to be unbiased. The Border Approach can produce local eects at the disaggregate level when border and non-border regions dier. We nd evidence of a statistically signcant dierence when analysis is restricted to those counties where identifying assumptions are more plausible. The point estimate drops to nearly zero and becomes insignicant despite a standard error that is as small as the lowest IV standard error. We suspect local estimate concerns are greater for the Border Approach because it identies advertising eects that exclude the high population counties in all markets, whereas IVs may weight each market dierently but include counties of all types within each market.
Introduction
Modern applied econometricians seek exogenous variation to make causal inferences. The following three approaches are quite prevalent: quasi-experimental sources that may be justied by unconfoundedness assumptions, discontinuities that arise across borders, or instrumental variables. While each empirical approach has its own limitations in addition to arguments about validity of identifying assumptions, much recent debate centers around the following two themes. One, statistical power may be sacriced by using weak instrumental variables or discarding observations where identifying assumptions do not hold. Two, estimates may not reect the average eect because some observations are disproportionately weighted over others. The above two themes are most relevant for the latter two sources:
border discontinuities, and instrumental variables.
Our focal empirical application is identifying advertising eects, in which decisions of advertising investment occur at one geographic level (e.g., the entire nation or a designated market area, DMA), but eects are measured at multiple lower level geographies (e.g., DMAs or counties respectively). Two recent strands of advertising studies make use of this layering structure. One is what we term the Local Variation Approach and was introduced to the literature by Hartmann and Klapper (2017) . They estimate advertising eects for nationally telecast Super Bowl ads using DMA level viewership that varies exogenously due to local preferences for watching the game. Stephens-Davidowitz et al. (2017) extend this strategy to include an instrumental-variable component. The Border Approach is the other approach that is recently popularized in advertising research by Shapiro (2017) where DMA level advertising eects are estimated by comparing adjacent counties falling on opposite sides of a DMA border.
1 The two adjacent counties receive dierent levels of advertising because ad decisions are made at the aggregate DMA level in response to demand shifters in other o-border counties in their own DMA. On top of these two, we propose the application of Waldfogel instruments (Waldfogel, 2003; Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2010; Fan, 2013; Berry and Haile, 2010) , which are DMA-aggregates of observed demand shifters existing in the county-level advertising conversion model. As we will elaborate later, Waldfogel IVs and the Border Approach share one source of identifying variation: observable demand shifters 1 The Border Approach has also been applied in labor economics (Card and Krueger, 1994; Dube et al., 2010) and political advertising (Huber and Arceneaux, 2007) . As Shapiro (2017) notes and we expand on later, the denition of a DMA is however particularly useful for identication because its relevance in advertising contexts typically operates exclusively through advertising decisions. Relatively, Tuchman et al. (2018) compares the border estimates with xed-eect estimates for ads in various categories in order to pin down the magnitude of ads eects.
in other counties in their own DMA, although the Border Approach has a second source of unobserved demand shifters.
The goal of this paper is to compare instrumental variable strategies with border discontinuities from both a conceptual and empirical perspective. Conceptually, instrumental variable strategies exclude all variation in advertising arising from unobserved demand shocks. Unlike IVs, the Border Approach cannot exclude any advertising variation arising from unobserved demand shocks, so it relies on one of two assumptions about the spatial correlation of demand shocks. Either unobserved demand shocks for adjacent counties across DMA borders are perfectly correlated, or unobserved demand shocks for all counties within the DMA are uncorrelated with those for the border county, whether adjacent or not. Both assumptions are extreme, unlikely in practice, and appear to contradict one another. Comparing the two approaches, IVs leverage the valuable advertising variation from the Border Approach (observable demand shifters in other counties in their own DMA), while excluding the variation from potentially problematic spatially correlated unobservables.
Next, we compare empirical estimates to assess concerns that can arise in each identication approach. We use the case of advertising in US presidential elections because it is not only an important context, but has a mild and potentially zero endogeneity bias. Gordon and Hartmann (2013) argue this arises because a candidate's advertising is decreasing with unobserved demand shocks when leading its competitor in a market, but increasing when trailing. The non-monotonic relationship yields positive biases in some markets, negative biases in others and when an election is close there might be a nearly equal fraction of such markets. Their estimates support this in that a xed eect estimate is nearly identical to an estimate using supply-side instruments. This is particularly helpful for comparing dierent identication strategies, because otherwise we would not be able to assess how much of the dierences across estimators is due to endogeneity biases vs. the dierent weighting of heterogeneous eects that can arise in IVs and border approaches.
Returning to the question of statistical power, neither IVs nor the Border Approach increases standard errors enough to yield insignicant estimates. The supply-side instruments are weak with a low rst-stage F after using the Kleibergen-Paap correction for cluster and robust standard errors. The rst stage partial R squared is however 0.34. Standard errors increase by 71 percent over the xed eects specication but the estimates are still signicant with p-values less than 0.05. The Waldfogel IVs are much stronger with a rst-stage excluded F of 48.7 and a partial R squared of 0.48. We believe this occurs because demand shifters likely explain much more of the advertising variation than do ad prices. The importance of demand-side determinants in advertising is evident in the distribution of advertising across battleground and non-battleground markets as depicted in Figure 1 . When the instrument strategies are combined to include both demand and supply-side determinants of advertising, the rst stage F increases to 56.9 with a partial R squared of 0.64, yielding standard errors that are midway between the xed eect and using either instrument strategy alone. The largest standard errors in the Border Approach are at this same level and occur when we use only the small counties where the identifying assumptions are more likely to hold. When we apply the border approach to all border counties standard errors are only 7 percent larger than the xed eect estimate. We suspect the modest losses in statical power despite dropping so many observations result from the identifying variation existing at the aggregate level where no markets are dropped. The border xed eect may also further reduce variance.
The Border Approach and IV estimators dier substantially in the extent to which they can produce local ad eects. The most severe potential local average treatment eects (LATE) in IVs arise from non-compliance where the presence of advertising may not be inuenced by the instrument (Imbens and Angrist, 1994) . Since advertising is a market level decision, the LATEs will disproportionately reect some markets over others. The point estimates for the supply-side IVs and Waldfogel IVs dier by 18 percent, but the dierence is insignicant. The xed eect lies in between these and when both sets of instruments are used the point estimate is identical to the xed eect. The robustness of the IVs and xed eect estimate suggest LATE is not a concern here. The Border Approach potentially introduces a geographically local ad eect at the disaggregate county level, by excluding all non-border counties across all (aggregate) markets analyzed. When analyzing all border counties, the point estimate of the Border Approach is 23 percent smaller, though not signicantly dierent from the xed eects and IVs. However, when we restrict the analysis to small border counties where the unconfoundedness assumption, that local demand shocks do not inuence advertising, is more plausible, the point estimate drops by 83 percent to near zero and becomes insignicant, despite a standard error that is identical to the lowest IV specication. We run some robustness checks to validate that this is not an attenuation bias arising from measurement error problems in that county-level advertising is not actually observable and is instead proxied for by DMA level advertising. This does not appear to be the case because small non-border counties do not produce such small estimates. We conclude that the dierence arises because the estimated eects are local to small border counties and do not reect the larger, more urban high population counties that were excluded here, but are included in all of the IV and xed The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: in Section 2, we develop an illustrative econometric model of advertising decisions and response within a layering structure to motivate our analysis. Section 3 discusses the dierent identication strategies utilizing this layering structure for identication. Section 4 introduces Waldfogel instruments to the advertising identication problem. Section 5 presents the empirical application and results, while the nal section concludes.
A model of Advertising Decisions and Conversion in a Layering Structure
We dene an advertising conversion and allocation model (i.e. demand and supply side model) in which conversion is observed at a more granular level than allocation decisions.
The allocation decisions are made for groupings of recipients (targets) based on demographics such as geographic location, gender, age, past purchases, or any combination of the observed characteristics. Groupings can also be based on factors unrelated to individuals types. For example, one group could be a time period when a given advertising intensity is held xed.
Or, the grouping could be based on search terms or any other targeting variable that is not specic to a single response observation.
We focus on the common practice of advertising to individuals grouped by geographic region. A number of quasi-experimental approaches have been proposed to identify advertising eects specically by exploiting the key observation that the advertising decisions are made at a more aggregate level than which we measure conversion. We summarize these in 
Conversion model
We begin by describing conversion at the more granular level k, then model the advertisers' advertising targeting decision at a more aggregate level l. To clarify notation for how individual decisions aggregate up to levels k and l, let P = {1, 2, ..., N } be the entire population of consumers, and i ∈ P denotes any consumer. Let K = {k 1 , k 2 , ..., k C } be a partition of P , representing the granular layer to analyze conversion. L = {l 1 , l 2 , ..., l M } is a coarser partition of K, representing the layer where advertisers are making advertising decisions. By coarser partition, we mean for any 
where g(·) is a function that converts advertising levels to utility. This model implies
The advertising realized in a given market, A k (d l , x 2k ,z k ,ω k ) is a function of the variation in the coarser level l advertising decisions and/or variation in local realizations in viewership:
• Variation in advertising decisions d l : the advertising decision made at the more aggregate level l
• Variation in local realizations in viewership: 2 x 2k : determinants of advertising exposure which are observable both to the rm when the advertising decision is made and to the researcher z k : determinants of advertising exposure which are unknown by the rm when the advertising decision is made but are observable to the researcher ω k : determinants of advertising exposure which are unknown by the rm when the advertising decision is made and are unobservable to the researcher
We use tilde notation for variables that are unknown when advertisers make decisions and thus exogenous to demand shocks, such as weather, which might aect whether or not people are at home watching television when an ad airs. The logic of including each of these distinct factors will become clear when we discuss the assumptions and sources of variation in the identication strategies we consider.
Advertiser's problem
In making the advertising decision, d l , to each group l ∈ L, 
where n k is the population size in group k, p k is the price for the product, q k is the percapita sales, c is the marginal cost, w l is the per impression ad cost. The advertiser makes the advertising decisions d l based on (X l , ξ l ) = {x 1k , x 2k } k⊂l , {ξ k } k⊂l and w l . Solving the problem in (2), we get
2 There exists a fourth component ψ k , which are observable to the rm when advertising, but unobservable to the researcher. This may create extra bias if it is correlated with demand-side unobservable ξ k . However, we do not explicitly list this component here, as the channel is implicitly captured by the eect of ξ k on ads decision d l . 3 d l can either be a dummy variable that equals to one if the rm is doing ads in group l, or it can also be an ad intensity.
4 There is slightly simplication of notation in the following equation. Literally, by k ⊂ l, we mean k ⊂ l and k ∈ K.
The econometric endogeneity of A k arises because it is a function of the demand shock:
We use a static model for illustration but similar characterizations would exist in a dynamic advertising model. Due to our focus on factors that might bias advertising eects, we omit marginal costs of production c from the ad decision, but they could be included if a identication strategy were based on them. Pricing p is another endogenous decision which also aects ad decisions but we can abstract away from it for the purposes of the analysis here.
Existing Identication Strategies based on Layering Structure
In this section, we use the above model to describe existing advertising identication strategies and motivate another. The model also helps to clarify and evaluate the identifying assumptions. The parameter of interest is the ad eect α 1 in (1), reposted here as
and the econometric endogeneity of A k arises because it is a function of the demand shock in ξ k as shown in (4):
Local Variation Approach
The Local Variation Approach simply estimates (5) using OLS (or xed eects in panel data) disregarding the endogeneity bias. It is applicable in cases where ad decisions d l do not depend on the local demand shocks ξ k , thus there is no endogeneity concerns in (5). It draws inference of the advertising eects on variation inz k and potentiallyω k which together create local variation in the exposures given a market level ad decision d l , and pre-advertising local observables x 2k . So, the Local Variation Approach relies on unconfoundedness assumptions with respect to the demand shocks ξ k , (i.e. E [d l ξ k ] = 0 ), as well as the existence of
Border Approach
The Border Approach restricts estimation to a subset of observations k lying on the DMA border. It further includes border xed eects in (5) to capture the potential confounding elements discussed below as
where b (k) is a collection of counties lying both sides of the same DMA border. Similar to the Local Variation Approach, it assumes away the dependence of d l on local demand shocks ξ k , although for dierent reasons discussed below. What is dierent is the source of variation used to identify the eect. Unlike the Local Variation Approach relying onṽ k , the Border Approach relies on the variation of all observables {X l , w l }, as well as the unobservables in other parts of the DMA, ξ −k , to aect ad decisions and thus create variation in ad viewership A k . Note that only a subset of X l is a source of identifying variation for α 1 since x 1k identies α 2 . The identifying variation for α 1 therefore arises from
The unconfoundedness assumption is made clear in Shapiro (2017)'s description that any bias would need to arise from within-market, time-specic demand shocks that aect the rm choice of advertising.
Further identifying assumptions are that
The latter raises an interesting inconsistency in the spatial correlation of demand shocks.
Specically the correlation in unobservables between two adjacent counties k and k can be written as Corr (ξ k , ξ k ) = ρ · 1 k l(k) such that the correlation is ρ as long as k is not in the same aggregate region as k, otherwise the correlation must be zero. It is dicult for the Border Approach to work around this inconsistency. If ρ also equals zero, there is no value to the xed eect across adjoining border counties. Yet, if the correlation within a DMA border is non-zero, then the execution of dierencing out in Border Approach implies ρ = 1 for adjacent counties across borders. To avoid an inconsistency in the spatial correlation, we might require that Corr (ξ k , ξ k ) = 1 for any county k that is adjacent to any border county k.
In terms of identifying variation, the Border Approach relies on variation from other counties in the same DMA where the ad decision is made, {X −k , ξ −k , w l }. Typically, it disregards variation from Local Variation Approach, {z k ,ω k }, for two reasons. One is the data availability, that in all existing applications, only DMA-level advertising level A l is available, thus the county-level viewership variation is not observed.
7 Two, and more importantly, such county-level viewership variation would be dierenced out when including border xed eects in the execution, if the spatial correlation for the local viewership variation mirrors that for the unobserved demand shocks ξ k .
The Border Approach's identifying assumptions with respect to spatial correlation of ξ k are thus both complicated and unlikely in practice. The extent and source of identifying variation in {X −k , ξ −k , w l } is however quite appealing. Below we propose the use of Waldfogel instruments that include the variation from X −k , then in our empirical application we combine them with instruments using w l . This allows us to use all of the valuable identifying variation of the Border Approach, except ξ −k .
Supply-side instrumental variables
We introduce a third identication strategy that uses the ads cost w l as a supply-side IV to instrument for ads viewership A k . Although this identication strategy does not make use of the layering structure,
8 it is also consistent with our derived model in (5) and (6). Typical concerns with regard to instrumental variables arise, as we discuss below.
7 This further raises further a measurement error issue, which we discuss in later sections.
Contextual justications for identifying assumptions
The validity of identication strategies relies on their unconfoundedness assumptions, i.e., the variables that are assumed to be exogenous. This is especially challenging when we think about the ads decision in a fully rational model with strategic advertisers in Section 2.
Below we discuss the validity of unconfoundedness assumptions separately in the the Local Variation Approach, and the Border Approach, in their corresponding application contexts.
The supply-side instruments meet the inclusion and exclusion restrictions based on the model above and only further require that E [ω l ξ k ] = 0, ∀k ⊂ l. This assumption is invalid if the vector of demand shocks, ξ l , is substantial enough to inuence ad prices, w l .
9
The Local Variation Approach assumes away the dependence of ads decision d l on the demand shock ξ k . Hartmann and Klapper (2017) were able to justify this assumption in their beer application because there was no observed variation in d l such that all advertising variation arose at the local level k. In their cola application, they argued that ξ l = {ξ k } k⊂l Each of these Local Variation implementations conditioned on l-level xed eects to capture systematic variation in ξ l across l, but its possible that the advertising decision was made based on a relationship between local variation in the unobserved demand shocks ξ k and local variation in the advertiser's beliefs about viewership prior to making the advertising decision, {x 2k } k⊂l .
10 Both Hartmann and Klapper (2017) and Stephens-Davidowitz et al. (2017) argue advertising decisions are made well before rms know the competing teams in the Super Bowl, i.e. in the summer before the season even starts. But if advertisers were to observe say, the odds of each team making the Super Bowl, and selectively advertise or not based on this, that would confound the estimation. In such a case, the econometrician should condition on this {x 2k }.
The unconfoundedness assumption in the Border Approach implies that the advertiser either did not know ξ k −ξ b(k) or found it too trivial to incorporate into the advertising 9 See Gordon and Hartmann (2013) for further discussion about this and proposed alternatives.
10 Here we slightly abuse the notation. In our previous denition, x 2k is observed to researchers, but here we are talking about some viewership-shifters that may either be observed or unobserved. They may contaminate the identication if they are correlated with the demand shock ξ k . Waldfogel instruments utilize the same type of variation in advertising, recognizing that a focal region k receives an aggregate treatment A l that is inuenced by variables in other regions, −k, of the aggregate. A primary dierence is that, as an instrument, it focuses inference on those variables that are observable, X −k . In practice, the Waldfogel instrument is typically the aggregate observable demand determinants in the entire DMA, h (X l ), which instruments for the advertising levels observed in a focal DMA, A l . Yet, after conditioning on x k , the identifying variation exists within X −k .
Identifying Assumptions in Waldfogel Instruments
The identifying assumption for the Waldfogel IVs is E (X l ξ k |x 1k ) = 0. The same assumption is required for the Border Approach if cross-border correlations in demand shocks are less than perfect.
If there are concerns that observable demand determinants inuence local markets for reasons other than advertising, , we can further exclude these nearby markets (denoted as n (k)) in aggregation, i.e. X −n(k) .
11 An example might be if, for example, state level decisions are made based on all of the counties in a state. Then X s(−k) can explain statelevel decisions whereas X −k explains DMA level decisions. Since DMAs are used almost exclusively for television and advertising, the DMA level aggregation explains how related counties aect advertising separately from how dierent clusters of related counties might explain other factors.
Empirical Application
While the purpose of the various identication strategies we have discussed is to resolve econometric endogeneity biases, we consider a case where there is no obvious unidirectional endogeneity bias (i.e. ∂A /∂ξ is not monotonic). This allows us to better compare the local weighting of advertising eect that can be produced by instrumental variables or border strategies.
Gordon and Hartmann (2013) point out and nd that endogeneity biases are not a substantial concern in the case of political advertising. A candidate's incentive to advertise diminishes if the unobserved (to the researcher) determinants of voters preferences for the candidate is either too high or too low. In political language, candidates only tend to 11 Waldfogel (2003) ; George and Waldfogel (2003) ; Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010); Fan (2013) ; Berry and Waldfogel (2015) ; Berry and Haile (2010) 
advertise in battlegrounds where voters neither like them too much nor too little. Gordon and Hartmann (2013) show this pattern as evident in the distribution of advertising across the political leaning of advertising markets in Figure ? ?, and then document that xed eects estimates yield nearly identical estimates to those using supply-side instruments (ad prices from the year before the election). We replicate these results and then compare them to specications which separately apply the Border Approach and Waldfogel IVs.
Political advertising also highlights the unique and important value of the Waldfogel IVs inclusion of demand determinants of advertising as sources of identication. The variation in Figure 1 is extensive and systematic, but the ad prices Gordon and Hartmann (2013) use as instruments likely explains a limited part of that variation. Most of the advertising incentives are driven by demand side factors. To the extent local unemployment, income etc., or changes in these variables over time motivate voters to consider switching parties, and hence advertisers to reach out to them, the Waldfogel IV approach relies on identifying variation that should drive much more of the observed distribution of advertising. We document this in the following estimates. Table 2 provides the estimates using the model and data from Gordon and Hartmann (2013) .
Gordon and Hartmann (2013) Fixed Eects and IV Specications
The rst two columns are the xed eects and IV specications from their paper. Notably, the estimates are incredibly close, despite the IV estimate relying on variation in how candidates separately incorporate ad prices across dierent day parts into their advertising decisions. The partial R 2 in the IV specication is 0.34 suggesting the ad prices do explain a reasonable amount of variation above and beyond the xed eects and demand side observables at the county level. The F statistic is however quite low.
12 The instruments are therefore weak, explaining an increase in the standard errors reported, yet not so weak as to yield the estimates insignicant.
Waldfogel Instruments in Political Advertising Data
Next, we consider the Waldfogel IVs that introduce demand side determinants of advertising into the instruments. Gordon and Hartmann (2013) include a variety of demand side observ-12 The original paper reported an F of 88.2, but it becomes low as 2.6 after Kleibergen-Paap correction for cluster and robust standard errors. with standard errors falling midway between the previous IV specications and the xed eects estimates. Some precision is lost with these IVs, but not as much. Encouragingly, the point estimate is almost exactly the same as found in the xed eects and IV specications Gordon and Hartmann (2013) estimated. From this we conclude that neither weak instrument nor LATE concerns arise in the IV specications.
Border Approach in Political Advertising Data (all border counties)
Finally, we apply the Border Approach based on Shapiro (2017) . In these specications, we shift away from instrumental variables approaches that can be justied by the model of advertiser's behavior, to an unconfoundedness approach that restricts analysis to a subset of regions where local dierences in demand are assumed to be excluded from the advertiser decision. As Shapiro (2017) notes, a critique this approach has faced is that the estimates may be local to only those counties in border regions and not generalizable to the majority of counties in the country. This can be dicult to assess in applications with endogeneity because the estimates may dier because of the locality or because the identication strategy is better (or worse) at resolving endogeneity problems. However, by focusing on the current political case where endogeneity biases are less likely to be signicant, these should be separable. These estimates in column (5) are conducted on 2,540 bordercounty-party-year observations, corresponding to 635 border-counties (involving 545 out of 1,607 unique counties analyzed in Gordon and Hartmann (2013) ) for two parties in two years. The advertising coecient using the border strategy is about 20 percent lower but based on the standard errors this is not a signicant dierence from the preceding estimates.
Standard errors are only slightly larger than the xed eects which include 2.5 times as many observations. We believe this is because standard errors are clustered at the DMA level, where the advertising variation arises, and there are the same number of DMAs included in all specications.
5.4 Border Approach in Political Advertising Data (small border counties)
As described at the end of section 3.4, some border counties represent a large share of the DMA such that the identifying assumption, E d l ξ k −ξ b(k) = 0, is unlikely to hold. We therefore restrict our analysis to counties in small borders where this assumption is more plausible for borders that represent a small share of the DMA. While the lack of a clear endogeneity bias suggests this restricted sample will not resolve a bias, it is possible that small borders may be more likely to have local, spatially heterogeneous eects. Alternatively, it may also come from the measurement error problem when unobserved county-level ad exposure is proxied by its aggregation in the DMA level; and such measurement error problems are more severe in small border regions. We use simulations in Appendix A to show that small counties are more subject to measurement error in ad exposure, which would biases the estimates downwards.
We dene small borders to be those with the population in the border-DMA smaller than 10% of the total population in that DMA on both sides in both years 13 . We have identied 35 out of 93 borders to be small, which corresponds to 213 out of 635 border-counties. Column (6) reports the Border Approach on this subsample of small borders. We nd that dropping additional counties does increase standard errors, but they are still no larger than any IV specication. In fact, the R-squared is larger than when analyzing all border counties. The notable dierence is that the estimated ad coecient drops to nearly zero.
In order to further understand the dierence in estimates from all border counties and small border counties (column 5 and 6 of Table 2 ), we complement with the following two sets of results. Specically, to provide evidence that the dierence in the estimates is not because the Border Approach applied to small borders are able to uniquely x an otherwise unresolved endogeneity bias, we rerun our other specications on these counties in small border regions. (2013)'s analyses on small vs large counties to see whether a small population share would reduce their estimated eects. Table 4 demonstrates that small counties do not generally tend to exhibit lower estimated eects. By elimination, this result suggests local eects are the likely rationale for dierent eects within the small border regions.
Political advertising may be unique in that those living in small border localities are dierent and may not respond the same to advertising targeted toward the population centers of media markets. But, it is also quite likely that these unique people may be inuenced dierently for antidepressant campaigns focused on population centers of media markets (e.g. Shapiro, 2017) and that they are also dierentially inuenced by consumer packaged campaigns (Tuchman et al., 2018) than those in the localities that are more likely to have Whole Foods, Trader Joes and other grocery outlets that do not carry or similarly emphasize traditional packaged goods.
In Appendix B, we explore alternative border implementations where we pair counties (as opposed to groups of counties) on a border. The general conclusion holds that small border counties appear to yield systematically dierent inference that is common to the various estimators we consider.
Discussion
Overall these analyses suggest robust ndings across the xed eects and instrumental variable specications, despite very dierent sources of identifying variation. Had an endogeneity bias actually existed in this data, we should at least expect the xed eect estimate to be much dierent. An application of Shapiro (2017)'s Border Approach provides an eect which is smaller but not statistically dierent. However, this does not hold when borders that represent a non-trivial share of the DMA are excluded from the analysis..
Instrumental variables are not immune from locality in estimates, but the robustness of the Waldfogel IVs to two other, fundamentally dierent, sources of variation suggests no Notes: All columns use 196 counties for two parties in two years; these counties belong to in 35 small borders, dened as borders with the population in the border-DMA smaller than 10% of the total population in that DMA on both sides in both years. Ads is measured as 1 + Gross Rating Points (000). Controls include senate election, same incumbent, distance, population proportion in age buckets (25--44, 45--64 Notes: Columns 1 and 3 use 520 small counties, dened as counties whose population is below 1% of their DMA for both years, columns 2 and 4 uses the remaining 1,087 counties. Ads is measured as 1 + Gross Rating Points (000). Controls include senate election, same incumbent, distance, population proportion in age buckets (25--44, 45--64, 65+), unemployment rate, average salary, rain (2000), rain(2004), snow (2000), snow(2004). Lagged ads prices IV include lagged ads price (CPM) in dierent day time, interacted with party and year dummy, as instrumental variables. Clustered standard errors in parenthesis. * p < 0.1, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01 problem in our application. We suspect this is because the IVs are at least inclusive of all types of counties, even if some markets are weighted more heavily than others. On the other hand, the Border Approach systematically discards all high population, more urban, counties.
Conclusion
We have provided a modeling framework that describes the identifying assumptions of various approaches for estimating the eects of advertising. The framework highlights the similar identifying variation in instrumental variables and border approaches. The approaches dier in i) the identifying assumptions, ii) statistical power concerns, and iii) the potential to produce local eects. We have shown the identifying assumptions in the Border Approach to add a complicated and implausible structure of spatial correlation. The addition of demandside (Waldfogel) instruments to supply-side instruments mitigates weak instrument concerns and standard errors are only slightly aected in border applications because the focus on border counties does not reduce the number of observations of the more aggregate advertising decision. IV estimates could produce estimates that weight aggregate markets dierently, but this does not appear to be a concern. Border strategies can produce local eects based on the types of counties included. We nd ad eects are systematically dierent for all identication strategies when applied to the small border counties where its identifying assumptions are most plausible.
A Measurement Error
We mentioned previously, that in contrast with the Local Variation Approach that relies on local variation of viewership to identify ad eects, in most applications of the Border Approach, this variation is assumed away and the local ad exposure is measured at an aggregate level. However, if this assumption is not true, i.e., there exists local variation of viewership but researchers can only observe an aggregate measure, this will lead to a measurement error problem. In this section, we rst demonstrate the existence of such problem, then the relevance of it to the identication strategies discussed in this paper..
Finally we discuss the potential candidate solutions.
A.1 Measurement Error
In most applications, we have outcome variable y k (this can be either log q k or log q k − log (1 − q k ) depending on underlying demand models) expressed as:
In practice, we don't observe ner-level ad exposure A k . Instead, we only observe the aggregate level A l which mechanically equals
where n −k = n l − n k , and
by simple algebra, we have
Plugging this into the previous equation, we have
There are three source of bias in (8): 1. Cov (A l , u k ) = 0, simply because u k is a part of A l .
2. Cov (A l , ξ k ) = 0, since ad decisions are endogenously made.
3. Cov (x 1k , u k ) = 0, as x 1k is also considered in the ad decision, i.e., Cov (x 1k , d l ) = 0.
A.2 Three Identication Approaches Revisited
With the measurement error in mind, we examine the validity of three identication approaches discussed.
For the Local Variation Approach, there is no measurement error problem, as the local level ad exposure A k is observed, which is at the same level as conversion y k . For the Border Approach, even if the ad decision d l is unconfounded with respect to local demand shocks ξ k in (8), we still have the measurement error problem, so that the rst and the third source of bias still exist. The estimated coecient may even become negative as
For the Waldfogel IV Approach, h (X 1l ) is not a valid instrument anymore, as X 1l aects the ad decision d l , which is further correlated with measurement error u k .
In a general way, it is quite dicult to nd any valid instrument from observables {x k } k⊂l . These observables are observed by advertisers when making ad decisions, thus entering d l , and correlated with measurement error u k naturally. In our framework, the only candidate instrument isz k , which shifts the ad exposure in an exogenous manner (say, weather). It is unknown to the advertiser when making ad decisions, thus orthogonal to u k . And it is correlated with coarser level ad exposure A l through aecting the A k . We talk about the the validity of such instrumental variable solution in the next subsection.
A.3 Instrumental variable solutions
For simplicity, we re-write (8) as
As we showed before, both A l and x 1k in (9) are correlated with the ad decision, and thus endogenous to the error term u k . We seek instruments for both endogenous variables, if possible.
For ad exposure A l , we have candidate instrumentz k which shifts the local ad variation A k exogenously. To guarantee the validity of this instrumental variable, we need to assume out the spatial correlation betweenz k across dierent sub-region k within the same coarser region l, or elsez k is spatially correlated withz −k , which determines A −k and is thus correlated with the error u k .
Even if we assume the existence of the spatially-uncorrelated viewership shocksz k , we still need some instruments for x 1k . This is quite dicult, for the same reasons as before, that we need to nd some variables that are correlated with demographics x 1k but excluded from the ad decision d l . Fortunately, we don't need to nd such instruments if the only parameter of interest is β instead of α 2 . We can put the α 2 x 1k into the error term. The exclusion restriction of z k is still valid as Cov (x 1k ,z k ) = 0. Alternatively, we can use a control function and decompose the error term ν k as
and plug in (9) to get
There is no advantage of a control function approach over a put-in-error approach, as neither provides consistent estimates of α 2 .
A.4 Quantifying the Bias
The instrumental variable approach described in the previous subsection is quite restrictive.
On the one hand, it is not easy to nd such spatially-uncorrelated exogenous viewership shifters. On the other hand, the extent to which an instrument will aect the ad exposure, thus the strength of the instrument, is an empirical question. In this subsection, we quantify the bias (relative to α 1 ) in applying OLS on (9). For simplicity, we ignore the term of α 2 x 1k , and thus the third source of endogeneity in A.1. The formula for the bias iŝ
with some simple calculation (detailed proof in A.5) we havê
where the rst term speaks to the measurement error, and the second term speaks to the endogenous ads decisions.
Classical measurement error issue always relates to attenuation bias. If we look at the rst term of (10), in the standard measurement error problem, A l is an erroneous measure of A k , say, A l = A k + e k the variation of A k will be contaminated with noise in its measure
implying downward bias. However, in the current context of counties within the same DMA,
the rst term implies that DMA-level ads exposure A l is a weighted average of county-level A k thus with smaller variance, which will bias the estimates upwards; the second term may drive the estimates downward, but it is not pure noise, which is dierent from the classical measurement error. To further investigate the direction of the bias, we assume symmetry among dierent counties k other than the size, i.e., Var (A k ) = v and Corr (A j , A k ) = ρ, and B 1k can be simplied as
Obviously when B 1k = 1 when ρ = 1 or n k = n j for j, k ⊂ l. In other words, there is no measurement error problem if (1) there is no local variation of viewership, and A l is the exact measure of A k , or (2) there is no asymmetry across dierent counties. In this case, the two directions cancel out which lead to unbiased estimates.
To further understand the direction of bias under asymmetry, we plot one numerical example in Figure 3 for eight counties in one DMA. The size of the counties, n k , are picked randomly from 3 to 9, and we plot the value of B 1k under dierent values of ρ. First, in contrast with the standard attenuation bias which always bias downward the estimates, in our setting, the estimates are biased upward for large counties. Second, the magnitude of bias is decreasing in ρ. In the extreme case with ρ = 1, there is no measurement error and A l = A k , B 1k = 1.
A second source of bias relates to the endogenous ad decision, which is captured by the second term of (10). To simplify B 2k , we write out the rst order condition of (2) as
and let
with some simplication shown in A.5, we have
where
and if r k is constant in (13), B 2 = 0.
A.5 Proof
The bias term isα
To derive (12), with our assumption, Cov (A j , A k ) = ρv for j = k, we have
plug in to get (12).To derive (14), observe that the numerator for B 2k is
where the second line is derived using Delta method (rst-order expansion of A j = E (A j ) +
B County Pairs in the Border Strategy
The border approach used by Shapiro (2017) diers from others such as Dube et al. (2010) , in that the unit of analysis that is matched to form a cross-border pair is an aggregation of the counties on a given border as opposed to individual counties. This is more conservative in that all counties on a given side of the border are typically assumed to be treated the same, and Shapiro (2017) eectively has fewer observations than if analysis was conducted at the county level. In our analysis above, we used county-level observations for comparison to Gordon and Hartmann (2013) , but kept the pairing at the border-region level. This dierence becomes particularly relevant when we exclude border regions that represent at least 10 percent of the DMA population. Pairing at the border-region level allows small counties on two sides of a DMA border to be included in the analysis even if a neighboring county in the border region might have been large enough to put the whole border region at a population share greater than 10%. This pairing gives more statistical power to the Border Approach while still limiting the inuence of larger counties that may drive advertising decisions.
14 Table 5 reports xed eects, instrumental variables and border strategy estimates for 14 This approach may be questionable in that it acknowledges that an adjacent border-region may be driving advertising incentives but still assumes that local small county factors are irrelevant given their counterpart on the other side. In other words, it assumes that an adjacent county on the opposite side of a border is more similar than an adjacent county on the same side of the border.
county-pair matches. There are 541 counties on the DMA border that form 545 matched pairs, where matching is done with replacement. Counties on average appear just more than twice since they match with multiple counties on the opposite side of their DMA border.
Columns (1) and (2) document xed eects and IV estimates on this sample, with both the supply-side and Waldfogel instruments. The estimates are similar to those found in Table 2 , even though non-border counties are excluded from the analysis. Column (3) applies the Border Approach by including the party-pair-year xed eect which is a common time-specic eect for the counties on each side of the border and within the focal pair. The estimate here is smaller, as in Table 2 . Columns (4) to (6) replicate this analysis for the sample of those county pairs that are each less than 3% of their DMA population. This reduces the number of observations by about half. The estimates are remarkably close across all specications despite using very dierent sources of variation for identication. The estimates are, however, all substantially smaller than the xed eects and IV specications that were not restricted to these small border regions. This indicates clearly dierent inference in these regions and is once again suggestive that narrowing the focus of counties identies eects that may not be generalizable to non-border counties and larger border counties that drive advertising decisions. to small county-pairs, dened as county pairs with county-to-DMA population ratio smaller than 3% for both counties in the pair and in both years. Ads is measured as 1 + Gross Rating Points (000). Controls include senate election, same incumbent, distance, population proportion in age buckets (25--44, 45--64, 65+) , unemployment rate, average salary, rain (2000), rain (2004), snow(2000), snow(2004) . Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at party-DMA and party-border simultaneously. * p < 0.1, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01
